Comments on Lynn A. Stourt\u27s \u3ci\u3e \The Investor Confidence Game\u3c/i\u3e by Mayer, Martin
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 2
The Ninth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Article 3
12-1-2002
Comments on Lynn A. Stourt's \The Investor
Confidence Game
Martin Mayer
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Martin Mayer, Comments on Lynn A. Stourt's \The Investor Confidence Game, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 449 (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol68/iss2/3
COMMENTS ON LYNN A. STOUT'S THE INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE GAME
Martin Mayer'
I agree heartily with Professor Stout's basic thesis that
as the game plays on Wall Street, investors' faith in the
supposedly unbiased recommendations of the brokerage houses
will trump information about traded companies every time
when the intrepid explorers of finance go out to discover the
prices.1 Of course, most people do not approach money
rationally. Only economists, and not all of them, could believe
otherwise. For years, the most influential pieces of information
in the securities markets have been the estimates by the sell-
side analysts, including these silly price targets.' Regulation
FD,' for which ignorant and self-interested people trashed Art
Levitt,5 keeps the analysts from accompanying their estimates
with winks and nods indicating insider information, but there
is still a lot of trust out there. The assertion in academia that
people willingly make themselves vulnerable when they trust
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Martin Mayer is currently a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. He
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1 This Article comments on Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 407 (2002).
2 See, e.g., Charles R.P. Pouncey, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic
Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 273-74
(2002) (arguing that "economic rationality" is required for "neoclassical theory"
economists to maintain a "claim to legitimacy").
3 See R. Scott Raynovich, Personal Capital: Take Sell-Side Analyst Ratings
with a Grain of Salt, Red Herring, Sept. 14, 2000, at http://www.redherring.com/invest-
or/2000/0914Iinv-pc091400.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
4 See SEC, FACT SHEET: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE AND NEW INSIDER
TRADING RULES, Aug. 10, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
' See, e.g., Neal Lipschutz, Regulation FD and the Media, BUS. WIRE, July
24, 2002, at http://www.businesswire.com/fdcolumn/lipschutz-05252001.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2002).
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others6 does not advance our understanding of the entire
brokerage industry as we know it. Having brushed aside as
old-fashioned concerns about conflicts of interest that were the
subject of congressional attention and SEC reports as long ago
as 1935, the industry was organized to exploit the fact that
trust makes people vulnerable. The words "trust me" are for
experienced people a source of concern, not confidence. As one
of the heroes of the current leaders of the law and economics
movement liked to say, "Trust-but verify."7
There is, of course, a reward for an acceptance of
vulnerability: trust saves a lot of expense. Information costs;
trust is free-in the short term. The way people who know
better than the analysts make money is not by contrarian
selling, but by joining the mob early and getting out sooner.
Professor Romano's notion that informed investors will not buy
fraudulently promoted stock is naive.' Of course they will buy
fraudulently promoted stock, as long as they think they can get
out while other people are still piling in. Much of the time, of
course, these bubbles are not fraudulent, just enthusiastic. An
issue of the Economist last spring featured a little story about
the stock of a temporary employment firm that had run up and
then down; a bank analyst who had followed the stock said that
the CEO of the company "became intoxicated with the echo
from Wall Street of his rhetoric."9 Where does efficient market
and rational expectations theory put the stock priced by
intoxicated recipients of the echo from Wall Street? Perhaps
with Barnum's insight that "there's a sucker born every
minute .""
' See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, LAW V. TRUST (Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 00-38, George Mason University School of Law, Oct. 2000).
7 When Ronald Reagan used the expression in arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union, he employed the old Russian maxim "doveryai no proveryai"
("trust but verify"), currently invoked in a range of circumstances. See The Signing:
"Universal Significance for Mankind," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1987, at A21, cited in Philip
R. Principe, Secret Codes, Military Hospitals, and the Law Of Armed Conflict: Could
Military Medical Facilities' Use of Encrypted Communications Subject Them to Attack
Under International Law?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 727, 750 (2002)
(transcribing remarks of President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
during signing of treaty pledging the removal of Soviet and American medium and
short range nuclear missiles from Europe).
8 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
9 In a Ditch, ECONOMIST, April 13, 2002, at 62 (quoting Charles Gunther,
who analyzes the company Labor Ready's shares for Wells Fargo).
10 This quotation is attributed to P.T. Barnum. THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF
QUOTATIONS (1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/19/5619.html (last visited
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Incidentally, it's crazy to argue, as Merrill Lynch now
does, that the registered representatives should not own the
stock they tout.1 I want them to own what they push at me.
The rule I want is that they and their firms can't sell the
shares we both own until after they've told me that that they
plan to do so. And in the meantime, I want mandatory publicity
for all hedging activity-equity and credit derivatives-that
gives the bank or the broker an interest adverse to the
interests of the holder of the securities they have sold her.
It is quite true, of course, that without some level of
trust, public securities markets would be impossible. Indeed,
the trust and the need for it go a good deal deeper than
Professor Stout suggests. The truth is that you don't own the
stock you buy. It is owned by Cede & Co., 2 an organization of
which you have probably never heard in your life, that owns
much of America-$23 trillion worth of paper, last I looked.
Cede & Co. is the nominee of the Depository Trust Co. ("DTC"),
which clears all securities transactions and many transactions
in municipal and asset-backed paper. 3 For example, when you
as a customer of, say, Morgan Stanley buy a few hundred
shares of some company from a customer of, say, Charles
Schwab, the transaction, verified by the brokers or their
clearing agents, creates two contracts. One is between Morgan
Stanley and the National Securities Clearing Corporation
("NSCC"), by which NSCC promises to deliver shares to
Morgan, and Morgan promises to pay for them, on the third
day after the trade. 4 The other is a contract between the NSCC
and Schwab, by which Schwab promises to deliver the shares to
NSCC, which in turn promises to pay Schwab." The shares
themselves, however, will never move. They are immobilized in
the vaults of the DTC, in the name of Cede & Co.'6
Oct. 20, 2002).
" See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §
14 (4th ed. 2002).
12 See Shareholder Services Client Services Guide-Glossary, Mellon Investor
Services, at http://www.mellon-investor.com/corporations/shareguide-gloss.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
13 See About DTC, The Depository Trust Company, at
http://dtcservices.dtcc.com/aboutdtc/dtcintro/dtcintro.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
14 See generally 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-
DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAw § 8 (2001).
15 23A id.
16 23A id.
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When the time comes to settle the trading of which your
transaction was a part, NSCC adds up all of Morgan's
transactions in the traded company's stock and arrives at a
number, adding to or subtracting from the total number of
shares of the stock owned by Morgan and its customers (and
the other brokers for which Morgan clears). 7 This means that
Cede & Co. acknowledges that it owes Morgan a certain
number of shares. Meanwhile, Schwab gets another message
from NSCC, informing the firm of the change in its right to
claim shares from Cede & Co. NSCC, which was once owned by
the New York Stock Exchange but is now a subsidiary of DTC,
also tells the brokers how much cash they must pay to or will
receive from DTC as a result of that day's work. 8
The traded company does not know you own its shares.'9
Neither does Cede & Co., or DTC or NSCC. As they used to say
in the hair-dye ads, only your broker knows for sure. The
traded company, which issued the shares you think you own,
will communicate with you through your broker. Your broker
will credit your account with dividends and order printed
material-annual and quarterly reports and the like-from
Automatic Data Processing, which has a printing plant the size
of several football fields halfway out on Long Island to supply
such goods to American industry. ° DTC is very careful about
who is permitted to use its facilities, and-together with the
stock exchanges, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, the Securities Industries Automation Council and the
banks that are the trustees for the mutual funds-it polices the
safety, soundness and accuracy of the record-keeping of the
brokerage houses. All this traces back to the bad old days of the
early 1970s, when brokers were still delivering shares of stock
endorsed by the previous owner to transfer agents who would
issue new stock to the new owners; little old men carrying
lawyers' redwells delivered securities and cash to the cages of
the brokerage houses; settlement was in five days and
transactions often didn't close for many days after that; and
many transactions never really closed at all because papers got
lost. If you're going to settle in three days-and now the
17 23A id.
18 Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 315 (1999).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Robert C. Apfel, New Developments in Bondholders
Communications, 1098 PLI/Corp. 453, 505 (1999).
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industry commitment is to settle trades the next day, T+1-
(and the commitment survives though a recent securities
industry association announcement said, please, not yet)-you
can't have stock certificates drifting around.
That is the world we live in. Why does it make sense to
trust the people who operate this world, but not to trust the
traders and issuers of securities?
In the last twenty years, the market and the law
generated a set of perverse incentives. Thirty years ago, Albert
Hettinger,21 already a very old man, the balance wheel of Andre
Meyer's Lazard Freres, said to me that the "[miost influential
teacher I ever had was the fellow who taught me accounting."22
His teacher used to say, "Accounting is a way to tell the
truth."23 I commented then that it would be a pity if that idea
died out with his generation, but it did, and it's a pity. The
accounting firms are not to be trusted because the way they got
business from corporate America, at least until quite recently,
was by helping companies cheat on their balance sheets, cheat
on their P&L, cheat on their taxes and cheat on their annual
reports. The accounting firm that was most creative in
conveying false impressions would get the most clients and the
biggest fees. It is called consulting. Nobody gets punished for
aiding and abetting fraud. The Andersen partners who helped
Waste Management lie to the market remained Andersen
partners;24 at least one of them got promoted.
2
Those who think law firms are different-that law firms
don't sell themselves to clients as assiduous searchers for
arguably legal ways to evade the intent of the law-are invited
to seek absolution from Cardinal Law. 26 Everybody's entitled to
a mistake if he will confess it.27
2' Albert Hettinger was a professor of economics at Harvard University in the
1920s. He spent most of his career as a partner at Lazard Freres. Among his
pioneering insights was a prescription to invest in six or seven companies and never to
invest on margin. See John Birger et al., 2001 Ultimate Investment Club, MONEY, Oct.
2002, at 76.
22 MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 338-39 (1988).
23 Id. at 339.
24 Jane Mayer, The Accountant's War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 64, 69.
215 Id.; see also Delroy Alexander et al., Civil War Splits Anderson, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 2002, at Al (discussing the proceedings against Andersen partners following
the Waste Management scandal and the subsequent promotion).
16 Cardinal Law is the embattled leader of the Catholic Church in Boston,
Massachusetts who, in light of the pedophilia scandal rocking the Catholic Church,
found himself asking for forgiveness from his parishioners as much as offering them
absolution. See Profile: Cardinal Bernard Law, BBC NEWS ON-LINE, Apr. 29, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1957915.stm (last visited Sept. 5,
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Let me note that it is simply not true that the world was
always like this. In some ways it was worse, but in others-
especially the sense of pride of the autonomous professional-it
really was better. Paul Cravath" urged a White House
committee to write legislation banning the sort of railroad
reorganization work that had made him rich, because it
enabled the bankers as bondholders to expropriate the poor
devils who had bought that stock from these same bankers a
few years before.29 Elihu Root ° liked to say that half the
business of any good lawyer was telling his clients they were
damned fools and should stop.3 Andrew Carnegie considered
Elihu Root his counselor;3  conversely Jack Welch, to pull a
name from the hat, shopped for lawyers by asking his general
counsel to buy legal services.33 You can shop for and buy legal
services on the Internet now, from big law firms.34
On Wall Street in the old days, "registered
representatives" were "customers' men," who took their
customers with them when they moved from job to job, whose
prosperity rested on their customers' prosperity and who
rewarded trust with loyalty3"-not all, by any means.
Customers' men were compensated by commissions, and some
would churn the account. Some-in my experience, many-
knew little about the market or the economy and spent most of
their time acquiring and dispensing gossip. But if the firm that
2002).
27 See Pitt Says Lawyers Will Be Held Accountable to Directors, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2002, at C2 (discussing law firms implicated in recent accounting scandals).
Paul Cravath, the key figure in the development of the law firm Cravath,
Swain and Moore, was known for his genius for organization, leadership and corporate
law. See 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM 573-76 (1946).
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV.
921,928 (2001).
'o Elihu Root, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, held a number of
prestigious legal and political positions including U.S. Attorney, U.S. Senator,
Secretary of State and Secretary of War. See DAN MORRIS & INEZ MORRIS, WHO WAS
WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS 500 (1974).
" See Thomas D. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947, 968-69 (2002).
32 Hon. Shirley S. Abramson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin
and the American Law Institute, The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 10-11.
'3 See JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GuT 136-37
(2001).
3, See, for example, http://directory.findlaw.com, an Internet attorney
database.
3 John Steele Gordon, Merrill Lynch Once Led Wall Street, Now It's Catching
Up, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1999, at A20.
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employed them had asked them to sell their customers junk
securities because the underwriting department had to dispose
the stuff, they would tell the firm to go to hell.
Don Regan reorganized Merrill Lynch and gave up the
interest on customer free balances-the largest single source of
income for Wall Street brokerage houses in the 1960s-to
break the stranglehold of the customers' men.36 There are gains
as well as losses in the new dispensation, but we have been
careless about the incentives we create. After the Bankers
Trust-Procter & Gamble fiasco,37 the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York joined with the swap dealers' associations to write a
code of conduct in the derivatives market." The code of conduct
they wrote was premised on the notion that all the participants
in these markets are sophisticated people. Thus, the rule
should be caveat emptor: if a derivatives dealer tells you he's
trying to help you solve your problem, don't believe him. 9 If you
can't trust your banker who says he is giving you ways to avoid
interest rate risk, why should you trust anybody except the
operations people.
Of course, we don't want volumes and discs of law that
people in markets have to consult every time they do business.
We want a sense of fiduciary obligation; we want what Melvin
Eisenberg called "social norms."4" Professor Eisenberg had the
bad luck of publishing in 1999, when it seemed reasonable to
say that "[t]he common experience of informed observers is that
the level of directorial care has risen significantly in the last
ten years or so; that directors today are more attentive to their
responsibilities."41 Now we know that the major task of
directors in the second half of the 1990s was to approve the
issuance of stock options that quadrupled in value over the five
years, from $26.5 billion a year to more than $110 billion a
year42-not, of course, charged as an expense, and not deducted
36 DONALD T. REGAN, A VIEW FROM THE STREET 129-31 (1972).
37 See Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct. 16,
1995, at 106.
38 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Principles and Practices for
Wholesale Financial Market Transactions, reprinted at http://www.ny.frb.orgtfxc/fxl8-
.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
39 Id.
40 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999).
41 Id. at 1266.
42 See Kathy M. Kristof & James Flanigan, Crisis in Corporate America:
Stock Options Lavished on Executives Comes Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at
B1.
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from profits after the accounting firms, Congress, the White
House and even the SEC denounced the Financial Accounting
Standards Board for proposing a commonsense rule requiring
the valuation and expensing of such options. Last spring,
Holman Jenkins, Jr., proposed in the Wall Street Journal that
the investment banks spin off their research departments to
advertising agencies, since the research departments are in the
advertising business anyway."
But that doesn't solve the problem: people trust
advertising, too. The question now is how do we eliminate the
perverse incentives, how do we cultivate social norms that
motivate accountants and analysts to attempt to present what
the British call fair and true statements of corporate activity."
In the chicken-and-egg argument between law and social
norms, clearly law has the better case. It is through the
internalization of rules that people achieve obedience to social
norms. And if we are going to have a rule of law, as Justice
Robert Jackson once observed, we will have to have some law.45
And we should, as Professor Stout argues, "pay attention to the
needs of the trusting investor."46
43 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Don't Shoot the Analysts; Spin 'em Off, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 17, 2002, at A21.
44 See Andrew Parker, Review Will Help Protect Standards, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 27, 2002, at 24.
45 Hon. Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 19 TEMP. L.Q.
135 (1946).
46 See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407,
431 (2002).
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